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"No sensible decision can be made any longer without taking into account not
only the world as it is, but the world as it will be."
Isaac Asimov
For many years, 35 U.S.C. § 271 capably addressed the different types of
infringing conduct that patent holders faced in this country. But technology has
changed the world, making products increasingly complex-both in the number
of components they contain and in where those components are made. These
changes have placed new pressures on the extraterritorial application of U.S.
patent law.
Traditionally, patent holders were primarily concerned with companies
that made or sold their products in the United States or imported them into this
country. If those products infringed a patent, that conduct was considered to be
direct infringement under § 271(a). Alternatively, if the products were material
parts of larger infringing products, the conduct was considered contributory
infringement under § 271(c). In today's world, many companies now make and
sell products abroad knowing that others will import their products into this
country. Since § 271(a) and (c) have express territorial limitations, direct and
contributory infringement do not apply to these types of overseas conduct.
The U.S. semiconductor industry provides a prime example. Although
there are several prominent U.S. semiconductor companies-Intel, Texas
Instruments, and Qualcomm to name just a few-most of these companies have
moved their manufacturing facilities off shore. Moreover, they do not actually
sell their chips in the United States or import them into this country themselves.
Rather, semiconductor companies sell chips outside this country to electronics
manufacturers who assemble their products abroad. Thus, even if a
semiconductor chip enters this country and eventually infringes a U.S. patent, the
manufacturer of that chip cannot be found liable for direct or contributory
infringement. Not surprisingly, patent holders have still sought to sue these kinds
of companies. They have turned to § 271(b)'s inducement theory, which has no
territorial limitation. Relying on this theory, patent holders have successfully
argued that essentially all types of infringing conduct taking place abroad
"induces" infringement in the United States.
But relying on inducement as the primary foreign infringement theory
leads to unintended consequences in the international arena. Since direct
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infringement is a strict liability offense, companies that make and sell products in
the United States can be found liable even when they do not know about the
patent. But inducement requires specific knowledge. Consequently, the same
company making the same product abroad will not be liable unless it knew of the
patent and thought it infringed or was willfully ignorant of the patent. It makes
no sense for the patent laws to discriminate against domestic conduct in this
manner.
This article takes no position on whether U.S. patent laws should or
should not encompass foreign conduct. Regardless of which side one favors, we
can all agree that the patent laws should take a consistent approach to
infringement regardless of where the conduct is located. This article offers three
alternate proposals. Each proposal provides a more coherent framework than the
current regime. However, the proposals assume different goals. The proper
choice depends on this country's appetite for extending or limiting the reach of
U.S. patent laws and which entity-Congress or the courts-should make that
decision.
This article proceeds in four parts. In Part II, I describe the primary
theories of infringement: direct infringement, inducement and contributory
infringement. Part II highlights two important characteristics of each of these
theories-the intent required to commit infringement and the presence or absence
of express territorial limitations. In short, direct infringement is a strict liability
offense that only applies to conduct in the United States. Inducement requires
the intent to infringe and has no territorial limitation. And contributory
infringement requires the intent to infringe, but only applies to acts committed in
the United States.
In Part III, I explain how an expansive theory of inducement has
emerged in the case law. Under this theory, inducement captures both overseas
conduct and conduct that has been typically considered direct and contributory
infringement. Thus, inducement has now been interpreted to cover making and
selling infringing products or material components of infringing products
overseas. Part III also provides a critical analysis of the case law and suggests
that the district courts have prematurely adopted the expansive theory of
inducement without considering important doctrinal issues.
In Part IV, I go on to discuss unconsidered policy issues associated with
the expansive theory of inducement. In particular, Part IV explains how the
theory leads to inequitable cross-border results. When a company makes or sells
an accused product in the United States, the company is accused of direct
infringement under § 271(a) and is judged by a strict liability standard.
However, if that same company were to make or sell the same product abroad,
the patent holder must pursue a charge of inducement because of the territorial
limitations found in § 271(a). Since inducement requires intent, proving foreign
infringement is far more difficult.
In Part V, I offer three alternate proposals that would each bring
coherence to the law. To the extent that the United States wishes to impose
liability on such foreign conduct, I suggest that Congress amend § 271(a) and (c)
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and broaden their territorial limitations to encompass this conduct. This proposal
would level the playing field by making the scienter requirement the same
regardless of where the infringing conduct takes place. However, if this country
does not seek to enforce its patent laws on foreign conduct, I suggest that
Congress amend § 271(b) to add a territorial limitation to the statute. This
proposal would limit the reach of U.S. patent laws and eliminate the problem of
discriminatory treatment. Finally, I offer a compromise approach. I suggest that
inducement could be limited so that it does not encroach on the other two
infringement theories. This proposal is not entirely satisfactory because the laws
would reach abroad to capture some categories of infringing conduct and exclude
others. However, the advantage of this approach is that U.S. patent law would no
longer discriminate against domestic conduct. To the extent that the laws
operated extraterritorially, they would treat foreign and domestic acts of
infringement equally. Moreover, this solution does not depend on congressional
action. Relying on the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
patent law, courts could simply interpret §271(b) more narrowly.
II. THEORIES OF INFRINGEMENT
"Ifyou would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development."
Aristotle
Section 271 of the Patent Laws is entitled "infringement of patent" and
describes three primary theories of infringement found in subsections (a), (b) and
(c).' They are generally referred to as direct infringement, inducement, and
contributory infringement, respectively. These provisions provide:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports
into the United States a component of a patented machine,
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) also outlines less common theories of liability. Under subsection (f), a
party can be found liable for infringement by supplying components from the United States when
those components are combined outside the United States in a manner that would infringe the
patent if such combination occurred within the United States. Subsection (g) states that a party that
imports a product into the United States made by a process patented in the United States shall be
liable as an infringer.
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for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
2noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
For many years, this three-part framework capably addressed the
majority of infringing conduct that patent holders faced in this country. For the
purposes of understanding the international contours of U.S. patent law, it is
important to compare the three primary theories of infringement: direct
infringement, contributory infringement and inducement. In particular, this
article focuses on two characteristics: intent and territoriality. Surprisingly, these
two characteristics differ substantially among the three theories and these
differences lead to important unintended consequences in the international arena.
This section reviews these three doctrines, highlighting the different intent and
territorial limitations required by each.
A. Direct Infringement
By far the most common infringement theory is direct infringement.
Under § 271(a), direct infringement encompasses five categories of conduct:
making, using, offering to sell, selling and importing a patented invention.'
Direct infringement is a strict liability offense. In other words, the theory does
not require any form of mens rea. Liability can be imposed even when the
infringer was wholly unaware of the existence of the patent when it made and
sold its product. Someone can even be held liable for patent infringement when
they independently develop the patented technology.
2 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
Id.
4 See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800 (2002) ("Patent infringement is a strict liability tort in the sense that
a defendant may be liable without having had any notice, prior to the filing of an infringement
action, that her conduct was infringing. In other words, innocent (i.e., unintentional or inadvertent)
infringement is not a defense to a patent infringement claim . . . ."); see also BMC Res., Inc. v.
Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Direct infringement is a strict-liability
offense, but it is limited to those who practice each and every element of the claimed invention.").
Intent does come into play with respect to damages. Damages can be enhanced upon a finding of
willful infringement. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Moreover, in some instances damages can be limited when notice is not given under 35 U.S.C. §
287. See Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating "the statute
defines that '[a patentee] is entitled to damages from the time when it either began marking its
product in compliance with section 287(a) [constructive notice,] or when it actually notified [the
accused infringer] of its infringement, whichever was earlier'). But process patent holders are an
exception to the notice requirement because of the practical difficulty of marking process
inventions.
5 Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1421, 1425-
26 (2009) ("Accordingly, in patent law, an individual who develops an already-patented technology
610 [Vol. 80:3
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The second important characteristic of direct infringement is that it has a
territorial limitation. To qualify as direct infringement, the first four types of
conduct (making, using, offering to sell, selling ) must occur in the United States,
while importing only qualifies as direct infringement if the infringing products
are imported into the United States.6
To illustrate how direct infringement applies, consider the supply chain
of a bicycle. Years ago, most bikes sold in the United States were also made in
the United States. The manufacturer would make the bicycle and then sell it to a
regional distributor.7 The distributor, in turn, would sell it to a local bike shop.
If the bicycle infringed a patent, the patent holder could sue any company in the
supply chain for direct infringement. The manufacturer would be liable for
making, selling and offering to sell the bike while both the distributor and local
shop would be liable for selling and offering to sell the infringing bicycle.8
Moreover, ignorance of the patent would be no defense. Bike shops would still
be found liable for direct infringement even if they had no understanding of what
patents covered the bikes they sold.
Of course most bikes are no longer manufactured in the United States.9
Like companies in many other industries, numerous bicycle companies moved
their manufacturing facilities abroad. Section 271(a) capably addresses this
simple cross-border complication. Although making or offering to sell an
infringing product abroad is not considered direct infringement, the importation
prohibition covers companies that do not actually make and sell products in the
United States. Thus, a company that makes bikes abroad can be found liable for
direct infringement based on the importation of those bikes.'0 However, if the
without knowledge of the patent and the technology's prior creation-a true 'independent
inventor'-is still liable if what she independently created falls within the scope of the patent's
claims.").
6 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). In cases where the location of part of the patented invention or infringing
conduct falls outside the United States, issues of territoriality become more challenging. See NTP,
Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The location of an offer
for sale is also surprisingly unintuitive. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v.
Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that an offer for sale
that appeared to take place outside the United States qualified as an offer for sale within the U.S.
because the final sale took place in this country).
See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (explaining how bikes used to
be distributed in the United States).
The customer is also liable for using the infringing bicycle. However, a patent holder can only
receive one recovery. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elects., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008)
("The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item."). Because of the difficulty in suing each
customer, patent holders typically choose to sue someone in the supply chain that is responsible for
a large number of infringing products.
9 Peter Suciu, Demand for New Materials Shifts Bicycle Manufacturing Overseas, CNBC (Oct. 18,
2011, 12:19 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/44857810/Demand forNewMaterials Shifts Bicycle
ManufacturingOversea (explaining how almost all bikes are now made in Asia due to labor
costs).
10 Besides suing in district court, patent holders can initiate investigations with the International
Trade Commission. If the investigations show that infringing products are being imported into the
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manufacturer is one further step removed from contact with the United States, §
271(a) will not reach it. Thus, a foreign company that does not import its own
product, but uses a distributor for importation, cannot be liable for direct
infringement. In that situation, the patent holder's only recourse has generally
been against the distributor or those companies that sell the infringing products
domestically."
Because of the territorial limitation found in § 271(a), the theory of direct
infringement does not apply to conduct that exclusively takes place abroad.
Instead patent holders have increasingly looked to an indirect theory of liability
called inducement. Indirect theories of infringement do not apply to parties that
directly infringe a patent themselves. Rather they impose liability on parties that
aid and abet others to commit infringement. The next section of this article
traces the development of these indirect theories of liability.
B. Indirect Infringement
Although § 271 describes inducement and contributory infringement
separately, this was not always the prevailing view. Historically, all indirect
liability was labeled contributory infringement.12  Contributory infringement
generally covered two types of activity." First, liability was imposed on those
that made a component of a patented invention that had no non-infringing uses.
For example, in Thomson-Houston v. Ohio Brass, the patents covered
combinations of components used in an electric street railway.14 The defendant
sold an overhead switch, trolley, pole and contact wheel." The court found that
since these parts could "only be used in the combinations patented," the
defendant was liable for contributory infringement.16
Under a second theory, contributory infringement could also occur if the
defendant took active steps to cause infringement. 7 For example, in
Westinghouse Electric v. Precise, the defendants made transformers and
United States and the existence of a domestic industry, the ITC can issue an order excluding the
offending articles from entry into the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004).
" See Nicholas Oros, Infringement Twice Removed: Inducement of Patent Infringement for
Overseas Manufacture of Infringing Products Imported by Another, 10 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH
J. 163, 164 (2006) (discussing how a patent holder can sue the U.S. customers of a company that
manufactures infringing products overseas).
12 Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 369, 371-75 (2006); see also Mark A. Lemley, Inducing
Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 225, 227 (2005).
3 See Adams, supra note 12, at 375.
14 Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 714 (6th Cir. 1897).
Is Id.
1 6 Id. at 723.
"7 See Adams, supra note 12, at 375; Thomson-Houston, 80 F. at 723 (stating that where there are
non-infringing uses, "the intention to assist in infringement must be otherwise shown affirmatively,
and cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the articles are in fact used in the patented
combinations or may be so used").
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condensers.18  The components at issue had both infringing and non-infringing
uses.'9  But the carton in which the components were sold and various
advertisements contained directions to use the components in the patented
radios.20 Consequently, the defendants were found liable for contributory
infringement."
When it enacted the Patent Act of 1952, Congress sought to codify the
22doctrine of contributory infringement.22 The legislation divided the doctrine into
two parts, subsections (b) and (c) of 35 U.S.C. § 271, respectively.23 Conduct
that falls within subsection (b) is now called inducement; the provision states:
"Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer."24 Active inducement corresponds to the second branch of the former
doctrine of contributory infringement where there was evidence that a component
with both infringing and non-infringing uses was sold with the intent that it
would be used to infringe a combination patent.25 Probably the largest segment
of inducement cases involves "affirmative conduct encouraging independent
third parties to infringe through advertising, solicitation, or instructions on how
to use a product in an infringing way." 26
Conduct that falls within subsection (c) was labeled contributory
infringement. Originally, this provision stated:
Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Precise Mfg. Corp., 11 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1926).
19 Id2 0 Id at 210.
21 Id. at 211-12 ("[W]hen a manufacturer, by so manufacturing and advertising, points out the way
in which this can be done, and thus, intentionally so acting, promote infringements of patentee's
rights, he becomes a contributory infringer.").
22 H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 9 (1952) ("The purpose of this section [271] is to codify in statutory
form principles of contributory infringement and at the same time eliminate this doubt and
confusion."); S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 8, 28 (1952); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., 377 U.S. 476, 485 n.6 (1964) ("[S]ection [271(c)] was designed to 'codify in statutory form
rinciples of contributory infringement' which had been 'part of our law for about 80 years."').
3 See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 521, 537-38 (1953).
24 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
25 Adams, supra note 12, at 386; Lemley, supra note 12, at 227.
26 Lemley, supra note 12, at 230; accord, e.g., Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal
Indus., 145 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (advertisements that encourage using a concrete saw
in an infringing manner are inducement); Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
1080, 1090 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (demonstrating and recommending infringing configurations of
product it sells is inducement); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d
1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (publishing medical articles that suggest the use of an assay in
infringing way was inducement); Sims v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1198, 1215 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (showing how to use its product in an infringing way in its promotional film and brochures is
inducement), rev'd on other grounds, 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979).
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invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-
infringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.27
Modem-day contributory infringement under subsection (c) corresponds
to the first branch of the former judge-made doctrine of contributory
infringement and is limited to circumstances where there is a sale of a component
that has no substantial use other than in an infringing combination.2 8 Thus, the
basic distinction between the two doctrines is that contributory infringement
under § 271(c) covers the sale of a component or other product that can be used
to infringe a patent, while inducement under § 271(b) covers "other acts" that
direct, facilitate, or abet infringement.2 9
1. Intent Required
Although direct infringement is a strict liability offense, both indirect
theories of liability have an intent requirement. The level of intent actually
required was first decided in the context of contributory infringement.
Contributory infringement involves supplying a component "for use in practicing
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of
such patent." 30 By using the term "knowing," § 271(c) explicitly requires some
form of knowledge. Originally, it was unclear whether the accused infringer
simply had to know how the component it supplied would be used, or whether
the accused infringer had to have some knowledge of the infringement as well.
Almost half a century ago, the Supreme Court resolved this issue in the
landmark Aro Manufacturing v. Convertible Top Replacement ("Aro Il")
decision.3' The Court held that contributory infringement required the higher
level of knowledge-knowledge of the patent: "[section] 271(c) does require a
showing that the alleged contributory infringer knew that the combination for
which his component was especially designed was both patented and
infringing."3 2
27 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 811.
28 Adams, supra note 12, at 386; Lemley, supra note 12, at 227.
29 Lemley, supra note 12, at 227.
'o 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (emphasis added).
3 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964). This is the second of
two landmark Supreme Court cases concerning the doctrine of contributory infringement and is
often referred to as Aro II.
32 Id. at 488. This view was endorsed by a slim 5-4 majority. In 2011, the Supreme Court
characterized this decision as "badly fractured." Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., v. SEB S.A., 131 S.
Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011). One of the primary authors of the Patent Act of 1952, Giles Rich, also
disagreed with the view of the Aro II court and wrote that one point which differentiates subsection
(b) from subsection (c) "is that in proving a case under (b) the evidence must establish active
inducement and that involves intent." Rich, supra note 23, at 537.
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Thus, to be liable for contributory infringement under § 271(c), a party
must not only know about the existence of a patent, it must also know that the
component it is supplying results in direct infringement by another.
Unlike § 271(c), § 271(b), governing inducement, does not explicitly
mention knowledge. Nonetheless, the courts have also interpreted inducement to
require some level of knowledge. Until recently, there was a great deal of
confusion about what level of knowledge was required. The original confusion
on the level of intent required for inducement was very similar to the issue the
Supreme Court first faced for contributory infringement in Aro II. It was unclear
whether the accused inducer simply had to know what acts it was inducing or
whether it also had to have some knowledge that those acts resulted in patent
infringement.
In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, the Federal Circuit held that
inducement merely required the intent to commit the acts that cause
infringement.34 Under this standard, the inducer's belief about infringement and
the patent's validity was irrelevant. In contrast, in Manville Sales v. Paramount
Systems, a different Federal Circuit panel found that § 271(b) required the intent
to induce infringement. 3 5 This required both the intent to commit acts and a
belief that those acts would constitute patent infringement. Under this standard,
an inducer's belief that the acts are non-infringing or the patent is invalid would
disprove intent. 6
In 2006, an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit resolved this split and
held that the higher standard-the intent to induce infringement-applied to §
271(b).3 ' The opinion in DSU Medical v. JMS specifically stated that a plaintiff
must show that an "alleged infringer knew or should have known his actions
would induce actual infringements." 38 The court went on to say that this standard
"necessarily includes the requirement that he or she knew of the patent."
However, just three years later in SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward,40 the
Federal Circuit appeared to take a step back from DSU Medical and adopt a
recklessness standard for inducement. The court found that inducement's intent
requirement had been satisfied by evidence that the defendant "deliberately
disregarded a known risk that [plaintiff] had a protective patent."4A The opinion
3 Some suggest that companies can now obtain a non-infringement opinion that negates the intent
requirement and insulates the company from inducement and contributory infringement.
34 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
3 Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
36 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 699 (Fed. Cir. 2008). ("Because opinion-of-
counsel evidence, along with other factors, may reflect whether the accused infringer 'knew or
should have known' that its actions would cause another to directly infringe, we hold that such
evidence remains relevant to the second prong of the intent analysis.").
n DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (intent to induce
infringement issue considered en banc).
3 1 Id. at 1304.
39 id.
40 SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
41 Id. at 1377.
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went on to say that "a claim for inducement is viable even where the patentee has
not produced direct evidence that the accused infringer actually knew of the
patent-in-suit."42 Surprisingly, the opinion in SEB v. Montgomery Ward was
authored by Chief Judge Rader, the same judge who wrote the DSU Medical
opinion. The opinion led to an immediate outcry 4 3 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict it raised.
In the resulting opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the deliberate
indifference standard the Federal Circuit had applied." Instead, the Court said
that inducement requires the same knowledge as contributory infringement.
Consequently, the Court held that "induced infringement under § 271(b) requires
knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.A 5
In sum, both inducement and contributory infringement operate quite
differently than direct infringement. These two forms of indirect liability require
both knowledge of the consequences they cause and the fact that those
consequences will result in patent infringement. In contrast, direct infringement
is a strict liability offense with absolutely no intent requirement. If direct
infringement, contributory infringement and inducement encompassed entirely
distinct categories of conduct, this discrepancy might not matter. However, as
described in Part III, that is not the case. Inducement theory has been growing to
encompass conduct that traditionally appeared to be the province of direct
infringement and contributory infringement. After all, a company that makes an
infringing product or component (i.e. conduct that constitutes direct and
contributory infringement respectively) almost always "induces" someone else to
sell and/or use that product.
2. Differing Territorial Limitations
Although subsection (a) always required that acts of direct infringement
have a connection to the United States, as originally drafted, neither subsections
46orsthstttdino(b) nor (c) contained a similar requirement. In other words, the statute did not
42 Id.
43 See Brief for 26 Law, Economics, and Business Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Global-Tech Appliance, Inc., v. SEB S.A., 594 F.3d 1360 (2010) (No. 10-6), 2010 WL
3019717 ("[T]he Federal Circuit has once again muddied the waters by identifying the culpable
state of mind necessary to show induced infringement under section 271(b) as 'deliberate
indifference of a known risk' that an infringement may occur in [SEB v. Montgomery Ward].");
Geoffrey K. Gavin, Induced Infringement After SEB v. Montgomery Ward, LAw360 (September
16, 2010, 2:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/188409/induced-infringement-after-seb-v-
montgomery-ward ("Many practitioners have suggested that the Federal Circuit's decision in SEB
changed the law or created uncertainty regarding induced infringement claims under § 271(b).").
" Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
45 Id. at 2068. The Court did allow for a small exception to this rule. The Supreme Court held that
the doctrine of willful blindness prevents a defendant from shielding itself from having the required
knowledge. Id. at 2069.
4 H.R. 3760, 82d Cong. § 231 (1951) (providing "(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a
patent shall be liable as an infringer. (c) Whoever knowingly sells a component of a patented
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say where the component had to be sold or where the inducing acts had to take
place. That does not mean that an infringer could have no connection with the
United States. To the contrary, a prerequisite of both inducement and
contributory infringement is that another party directly infringes the patent.4 7
Since direct infringement has a territorial limitation, a party would only be liable
if its foreign conduct resulted in direct infringement in the United States.
In 1994, Congress revised section (c) to add a territoriality limitation.4 8
The statute now reads:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into
the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.49
Oddly, this limitation was only imposed oi subsection (c), and subsection (b)
continued to have no territoriality restriction."
The legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952 gives no reason for
treating contributory infringement and inducement differently, nor does Congress
give any policy reason for the 1994. amendment to subsection (c)." In fact,
Professor Donald Chisum suggested that the change did not have any practical
effect because Congress did not limit the geographic scope of subsection (b). 52
Chisum points out that patent holders can sue for inducement to capture offshore
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use shall be liable as a contributory infringer.")
47 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341-42 (1961) (Aro I) ("It is
plain that [section] 271(c)-a part of the Patent Code enacted in 1952-made no change in the
fundamental precept that there can be no contributory infringement in the absence of a direct
infringement. That section defines contributory infringement in terms of direct infringement-
namely the sale of a component of a patented combination or machine for use 'in an infringement
of such patent."'); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Liability for
either active inducement of infringement or for contributory infringement is dependent upon the
existence of direct infringement.").
48 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
49 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (emphasis added).
so The legislative history for this amendment does not provide any explanation for the distinction.
51 Donald S. Chisum, Comment, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property:
Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 615 (1997) ("There appears to be no policy
reason for restricting section 271(c) in this fashion. The change may have been a grammatical
indiscretion.").
2 1d. at 616.
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conduct even when "the inducing conduct takes the form of the sale of a
component."5 3
Of course another reasonable interpretation of the 1994 amendment is
that it effected real change.5 4 After all, Congress explicitly placed a territorial
limit on § 271(c).ss That limitation suggests that companies that supply
components abroad are not liable for patent infringement. However, as described
in Part III of this article, the courts have not interpreted the statute in this way.
Instead, Donald Chisum's prediction has turned out to be accurate. Courts have
simply applied inducement theory to foreign conduct that has traditionally been
considered to be contributory infringement-supplying a material component of
patented invention.
III. THE GROWTH OF INDUCEMENT
"It keeps getting bigger and bigger."
THE BLOB (Paramount Pictures 1958)
Since direct infringement under § 271(a) and contributory infringement
under § 271(c) have explicit statutory territorial limitations, these statutes impose
no liability unless the conduct occurs in the United States. Recognizing that
inducement has no such limitation, patent holders have advanced an expansive
view of inducement to reach overseas actors. Under this broad view, inducement
appears to also engulf acts of direct infringement and contributory infringement.
Since products that are made or sold by one party are eventually resold or used
by another party, most acts of direct infringement can also be characterized as
inducement. Similarly, acts that were historically characterized as contributory
infringement can also be characterized as inducement. Supplying a material
component of a patented invention with no substantial non-infringing use
s3 Id. ("Further, section 271(b) on active inducement remains unchanged as to geographic scope,
and patent owners may be able to rely upon it to seek relief against a foreign manufacturer, even in
situations in which the inducing conduct takes the form of the sale of a component.").
54 See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995) ("When Congress acts to amend a statute, we
presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect."); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to
every word Congress used.") (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
ss Before the 1994 amendment, foreign conduct could subject a company to liability for
contributory infringement under § 271(c). See Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362
F. Supp. 722, 727 (D. Utah 1973) (holding that § 271(c) "prohibits the 'sale', whether or not
domestic," of unpatented ski boots specially designed for use in patented injection molding
technique); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1139 (7th Cir. 1975).
56 The odd exception appears to be "offers to sell" under § 271(a). Even when the communications
associated with the offer have taken place abroad, offers to sell have been interpreted to occur in
the United States if the resulting sale occurs in the United States. Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1310-11 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus,
there appears to be little reason to consider whether foreign offers to sell would also be considered
inducement.
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inevitably results in others making, selling and using the entire patented
invention.
This expansive theory of inducement operates to capture conduct that
appeared to be excluded by the territorial limitations found in § 271(a) and (c).
Since inducement does not have a territorial limitation, patent holders have
asserted this theory against overseas actors regardless of what infringing acts
these actors actually performed. So long as the infringing products eventually
enter the United States, patent holders have argued that foreign acts of direct and
contributory qualify as inducement under § 271(b).
Although the Federal Circuit has not directly addressed this theory,
district courts have increasingly adopted this expansive view of inducement. The
remainder of this section critically explores both the district court decisions and
the authority they rely upon. A review of the case law demonstrates that the
expansive theory of inducement has been constructed from unsupported
assumptions, poorly considered dicta and bad legal reasoning. That is not to say
that the theory lacks any legitimate justification. The statutory language of § 271
places no territorial limitation on inducement, but that same statute limits direct
and contributory infringement to domestic conduct. Courts should be hesitant to
interpret inducement so broadly that it consumes the other two doctrines and
thereby circumvents the explicit territorial limitations that are present in § 271(a)
and (c).
A. Tea Leaves from the Federal Circuit
Although there are a few relevant district court decisions that predate the
Federal Circuit,5 7 the story begins in earnest with two Federal Circuit decisions.
These decisions say nothing directly about the expansive theory of inducement,
but make conflicting assumptions about the scope of inducement. In Crystal
Semiconductor v. TriTech Microelectronics, Crystal Semiconductor owned
several patents related to technology that reduced or eliminated the effects of
electrical noise in Analog-to-Digital converter chips.ss It alleged that both Apple
and Intel/Windows personal computers contained CODECs (a type of
semiconductor chip) that infringed the patents.s' The accused chips were
manufactured in Singapore by TriTech.60 However, TriTech did not import the
chips into the United States itself.6' Rather it sold the chips to OPTi, which in
turn sold the chips to the U.S. PC market.62 Crystal Semiconductor sued both
5 See infra note 97.
58 Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).





OPTi and TriTech for patent infringement. 3 The jury found that both defendants
infringed the patents.64 The Federal Circuit affirmed the verdict, stating, "Tritech
did not practice the claimed '899 method in the United States. TriTech,
therefore, cannot be liable for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(1994). TriTech's acts in connection with selling its chip to OPTi, however,
constitute active inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)."s6
Although the decision assumed that liability for inducement could be
based on conduct that takes place abroad, the court did not did not actually
consider the issue.66 Rather, the decision focused on whether the jury was
adequately charged on inducement theory. The Federal Circuit found that it
was.6 7  In sum, the Federal Circuit made two assumptions in Crystal
Semiconductor. First, presumably based on absence of any territorial limitation
in § 271(b), the opinion reasonably assumes that inducement does not have any
territorial limitation. Second, without any explanation, the opinion assumes that
inducement overlaps with direct infringement. 8 But the consequence of these
two assumptions is that the explicit territorial limitation found in § 271(a) is
circumvented. In TriTech's case, that meant that inducement theory could apply
to selling an infringing chip abroad, conduct that would typically be considered
direct infringement if done in the United States. 69
Just two months later, the Federal Circuit issued a decision that seemed
to make precisely the opposite assumptions. In Shockley v. Arcan, the infringing
product was the Z-Creeper, a device that allowed mechanics to lie on their backs
63 id.
6 Id. at 1345.
65 Id. at 1351 (emphasis added).
66 That does not mean that there is no connection with the United States. Inducement requires
proof of direct infringement under § 271(a). See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580
F.3d 1301, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Since direct infringement requires a connection with the United
States, foreign sales must still affect the United States to qualify as inducement. See Timothy R.
Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility after Transocean, 61 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1905167, pp. 13-14 (stating how
the courts have not consistently applied the presumption that U.S. law "does not apply
extraterritorially absent a clear signal from Congress").
67 TriTech, 246 F.3d at 1351 ("The trial court properly instructed the jury to assess whether TriTech
literally infringed by actively inducing OPTi's direct infringement.") (emphasis added).
68 But see Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1975) (noting
that section "271(b) was not designed to subject to liability a party who actually [directly] infringes
a patent," but nevertheless concluding that when manufacturing is performed abroad it may
constitute inducement); Gould-Nat'l Batteries, Inc. v. Sonotone Corp., 130 U.S.P.Q. 26, 29 (N.D.
Ill. 1961) (suggesting that "active inducement or contributory infringement have been generally
limited to those situations where the defendant has inducd [sic] someone else to infringe the
plaintiff's patent and when the defendant himself has not infringed the patent by making, using, or
selling the invention").
69 TriTech does not appear to have argued that inducement and direct infringement should be
interpreted to cover different types of conduct. See Corrected Brief of Defendants-Cross
Appellants, Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics, Inc., No. 99-1558 (Fed. Cir.
Dec. 23, 1999), 1999 WL 33636267.
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while working on an automobile chassis. 70 The product was made by Sunex in
Shanghai, China, imported into the United States by Telesis and sold to Arcan,
which in turn sold the product to its customers in the United States.
One of the issues on appeal was whether Telesis and Sunex were jointly
and severally liable for damages assessed against Arcan. The Federal Circuit
found that under U.S. patent law, different infringers are jointly and severally
liable. Since Telesis imported the infringing product into the United States, it
was jointly and severally liable with Arcan. However, the court found that Sunex
was not jointly and severally liable because:
To be liable for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271, a party must
make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States, or import into
the United States, the patented invention. Although Sunex
manufactured every Z-Creeper that Arcan sold in the United States, all
of Sunex's activities took place in Shanghai. Sunex, therefore, cannot
be liable for infringement under § 271 nor be jointly liable with Arcan
and Telesis.
Although this passage does not specifically mention inducement or
subsection (b), the conclusion only makes sense if Sunex could not be held liable
under any infringement theory, including inducement.72 If Sunex had been liable
for inducement, the Federal Circuit should have found it jointly and severally
liable too.
The Shockley decision assumed that making and selling an infringing
product abroad does not expose a party to liability for inducement. There are
three possible explanations for this assumption. First, the court could have
understood direct infringement and inducement to cover mutually exclusive
conduct. Under this view, making, using, offering to sell and selling falls under §
271(a) and does not qualify as inducement under § 271(b). If this were the law,
there was no reason for the decision to address inducement. Second, the court
could have assumed that § 271(b) does not have an extraterritorial reach.
However, unlike § 271(a) and (c), there is no express limitation in the statute
making this assumption suspect. Finally, even though the passage identified §
271 generally, the Federal Circuit could have simply overlooked inducement
70 Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
7n Id. at 1364 (emphasis added). The issue of inducement was raised at the trial court. According
to the plaintiff, the district court erroneously concluded that the plaintiff "has not proven that Sunex
actively induced Arcan's infringement" because the corporate veil had not been pierced. See Brief
for Plaintiff-Cross Appellant at 54, Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., No. 99-1580 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2000),
2000 WL 34030976.
72 But see Oros, supra note 11, at 172 (suggesting that the Shockley decision might have only meant
to say that direct infringement under § 271(a) could not be based on foreign activities). Under this
view, the Federal Circuit simply overlooked inducement theory.
7 Most inducement cases do not concern conduct that would be considered to be direct
infringement, but activity like advertising, solicitation, or instructing a party how to use a device in
an infringing way. See supra note 26.
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under subsection (b). The court's failure to address inducement is perplexing
because Judge Rader, who authored the Shockley decision, also sat on the panel
in Crystal Semiconductor. Unfortunately, Shockley does not even mention
Crystal Semiconductor. In the end, observers can only speculate on the
reasoning underlying the Shockley decision; the opinion does not suggest which
one of the three potential explanations is correct.
As other commentators have noted, there does not appear to be any room
to reconcile Shockley and Crystal Semiconductor.74 The decisions simply make
conflicting assumptions about the proper scope of inducement. Four years later,
in MEMC Electronic v. Mitsubishi ("MEMC Electronic 1"), the Federal Circuit
had the opportunity to clarify this confusion and determine what kind of foreign
conduct, if any, could qualify as inducement. Unfortunately, the decision
further muddied the waters. The court found that MEMC failed to preserve its
claim of active inducement based on the defendant's acts in Japan.76 Citing to
Crystal Semiconductor, the court concluded that it "need not address whether
inducing activity [abroad] can give rise to liability under United States patent
laws."77 This statement suggests that the issue is unresolved, yet Crystal
Semiconductor assumes the opposite is true and that foreign activity can be the
basis for inducement. Thus, MEMC Electronic I simply added to the doctrinal
confusion.
Some interpret the Federal Circuit's decision in DSU Medical v. JMS to
provide another clue about its views.78 As discussed earlier, the decision is best
known for addressing a split regarding the level of intent required to show
inducement." As part of the decision, the Federal Circuit reviewed a jury
74 See 3 Mov's WALKER ON PATENTS § 12.43 (4th ed. 2010) ("It is frankly difficult to reconcile
Shockley v. Arcan, Inc. with Crystal Semiconductor Corp. Given that inducing and contributory
infringement have their roots in the law relating to joint tort-feasors, one would expect the result, as
to the liability of the foreign manufacturers, to be the same. Yet they clearly are not."); Oros, supra
note 11, at 171 ("The Federal Circuit's subsequent ruling in Shockley v. Arcan, Inc. was
inconsistent with its ruling in Crystal Semiconductor.").
7 See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (MEMC Electronic 1). MEMC alleged that semiconductor wafers manufactured by SUMCO
infringed MEMC's patent. The wafers were sold to Samsung Japan, which sent them to Samsung
Austin in the United States. SUMCO argued that it could not be found liable for infringement
because it manufactured and sold the accused wafers in Japan. However, MEMC pursued an
inducement theory; it argued "MEMC asserted that SUMCO encouraged and enabled Samsung
Austin to use the accused wafers by manufacturing wafers according to Samsung Korea's
s ecifications and by providing technical support to the Samsung Austin facility." Id. at 1372.
The court said that other acts might support a claim of infringement, including email activities to
Samsung Austin, making adjustments in the manufacturing process on behalf of Samsung Austin,
and technical presentations made at Samsung Austin. Id. at 1379.
77 id.
78 DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (intent to induce
infringement issue considered en banc).
7 See, e.g., Eric L. Lane, The Federal Circuit's Inducement Conflict Resolution: The Flawed
Foundation and Ignored Implications ofDSU Medical, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 198,
218 (2007) ("The Federal Circuit's en banc holding in DSU Medical finally resolved the perceived
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instruction that discussed the extraterritorial reach of inducement. The jury
instruction stated in part: "Unlike direct infringement, which must take place
within the United States, induced infringement does not require any activity by
the indirect infringer in this country, as long as the direct infringement occurs
here."so
Although the Federal Circuit did not discuss whether this statement
accurately described the law, some district courts have given great weight to the
fact that the instruction was included in the DSUMedical opinion. The Southern
District of New York said that "it seems unlikely that the [Federal Circuit] would
have quoted [the jury instruction] without qualification had there been a serious
question as to the extraterritorial reach of § 27 1(b)."8
Even though the opinion may have assumed that the jury instruction was
correct, courts should not rely on DSU Medical for the proposition that
inducement extends to all types of foreign conduct. The Federal Circuit was
clearly focused on another issue-the level of intent required to show
inducement.82 Since the Federal Circuit found that inducement requires a level of
intent that the defendant did not have, there was no reason for the decision to
consider whether inducement could encompass conduct abroad and, if so,
whether that included conduct that would typically be considered direct or
contributory infringement. Moreover, the Federal Circuit itself did not author
any statement on the foreign reach of inducement or whether acts of direct or
contributory infringement also qualify as inducement. There is also no indication
that the parties briefed issues regarding the proper scope of inducement, let alone
that the en banc panel considered them. Thus, DSU Medical is simply another
decision that makes an unexamined assumption about the expansive
extraterritorial reach of inducement.
In sum, the Federal Circuit has simply left confusing and often times
inconsistent "tea leaves" for others to interpret. Both Crystal Semiconductor and
DSU Medical strongly suggest that inducement covers conduct abroad. That
conclusion is entirely consistent with the statutory language found in § 271. Yet
Shockley assumes that the opposite is true-that inducement can only be based
on domestic conduct. Finally, MEMC Electronic I implies that, at least as of
2005, the issue was unresolved. Perhaps more importantly, even if inducement
encompasses foreign conduct, the Federal Circuit has not said whether
conflict in the court's precedent regarding the level of intent required to prove inducement
liability.").
'0 DSU Medical, 471 F.3d at 1305.
s1 Wing Shing Prods. (BVI), Ltd., v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., 479 F. Supp. 2d 388, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 2d 650, 659 (E.D.
Tex. 2009) ("Although the Court did not expressly approve this statement, it is unlikely that it
would have quoted it without qualification if it were a misstatement of the law.").
82 See DSU Medical, 471 F.3d at 1306 (holding that "inducement requires evidence of culpable
conduct, directed to encouraging another's infringement, not merely that the inducer had
knowledge of the direct infringer's activities").
8 See id. at 1307 ("Thus, on this record, the jury was well within the law to conclude that ITL did
not induce JMS to infringe by purposefully and culpably encouraging JMS's infringement.").
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inducement should be interpreted to encompass acts of direct and contributory
infringement. In truth, none of these decisions has made a sincere effort to
grapple with the issues raised by an expansive view of inducement.
B. Reading the Tea Leaves
Of course, observations about the bewildering state of Federal Circuit
law do not help district courts. These courts must read the Federal Circuit "tea
leaves" as best they can and apply the law to the facts of their cases. Three
district courts have done so. They have uniformly concluded that making and
selling an infringing product abroad can serve as the basis for inducement.
Soon after MEMC Electronic I, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to
the Northern District of California. That court, in MEMC Electronic II, became
one of the first district courts to say that "extraterritorial activity that induces
infringement is prohibited by § 271(b)."84 Unfortunately, this statement was
clearly dicta. The Federal Circuit decision in MEMC Electronic I had disposed
of any claim of inducement based on foreign activities.ss Thus, the only
inducement issue for the district court to determine was whether the defendant's
domestic activities constituted inducement. In light of the narrow issues on
remand, the district court had no reason to discuss whether foreign activities can
give rise to inducement.8 7 To make matters worse, the statement appeared in a
perfunctory summary of law of inducement; there was no analysis of the
extraterritoriality issue at all. Nevertheless, subsequent district courts have cited
to MEMC Electronic II as one of the few decisions to address the extraterritorial
application of inducement.
In Wing Shing v. Simatelex, the Southern District of New York agreed
with the Northern District of California's view. 9 The defendant, Simatelex,
manufactured coffee makers in China that infringed Wing Shing's U.S. design
patent.90 After the coffeemakers had been manufactured, they were transported
to either Hong Kong or Yantian, China (as designated by Sunbeam) and
8 MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 2006 WL 463525, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 24, 2006) (MEMC Electronic II) (citing Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech
Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
85 MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378-79 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (MIEMC Electronic 1).
6 Id. at 1379.
8 The district court's description of inducement was also superfluous because the court found that
there was no direct infringement. MEMC Electronic II, 2006 WL 463525, at *14. Consequently,
there could be no inducement no matter where the accused activities took place.
88 Wing Shing Prods. (BVI), Ltd., v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., 479 F. Supp. 2d 388, 409
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 2d 650, 659 (E.D. Tex.
2009).
89 Wing Shing, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 410.
90 Id. at 392-93.
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ultimately shipped to the United States.9' Although Wing Shing asserted that
Simatelex directly infringed Wing Shing's patent by importing, selling and
offering to sell the coffeemakers in the United States, the district court concluded
that the accused activity took place outside the United States.92 The decision
then analyzed whether this foreign conduct supported a claim for inducement.
The district court concluded that purely extraterritorial acts could give
rise to liability under inducement. In arriving at this conclusion, the Wing
Shing decision first looked to the existing precedent. Unfortunately, it
incorrectly characterized the law in several respects. First, the court was
apparently unaware of Shockley v. Arcan and mistakenly said that there was no
authority that limits the application of § 271(b).9 4 Second, relying on MEMC
Electronic II as its lead example, the decision said that "numerous courts have
held that, in contrast to § 271(a) and (c), § 271(b) applies to exclusively
extraterritorial conduct."9 5 However, MEMC Electronic II is unreliable for the
various reasons discussed above.9 6 Wing Shing also cited to a number of district
court decisions that predate the Federal Circuit.9 7 These decisions undoubtedly
support Wing Shing's view, but they have not been part of the current
conversation on inducement. Moreover, their analyses are not particularly
helpful because these decisions merely rely on a textual reading of § 102(b) to
conclude that inducement reaches abroad. Finally, Wing Shing gave undue
weight to the jury instruction found in DSU Medical.98 As discussed above, that
statement does not reflect the considered view of the Federal Circuit.
These criticisms do not prove that Wing Shing's ultimate decision was
wrong. After all, the text of § 271(a) and (c) has a territorial limitation, and §
271(b) does not. Rather, these criticisms merely show that the proper
interpretation of inducement was not nearly as clear cut as the decision made it
appear.
9 Id. at 394-95.
92 Relying on language from Simatelex's invoices, Wing Shing argued that title of the goods did
not pass to Sunbeam until after the merchandise arrived in the United States. However, the court
concluded that title passed in Hong Kong. Id. at 401-07.
1 Id. at 410.
94 Id. at 409.
95 id.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
9 Wing Shing, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 409 (citing Playskool, Inc. v. Famus Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
8, 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 485, 489 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) (using an expansive view of inducement without considering the overlap of
inducement and direct infringement); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137,
1141 (7th Cir. 1975) (suggesting that the act of direct infringement, if conduced abroad, can
constitute inducement); Hauni Werke Koerber & Co., KG v. Molins, Ltd., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
168, 170 (E.D. Va. 1974) (comparing the statutory language of subsections (a), (b) and (c) to show
that inducement alone has extraterritorial reach); Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362
F. Supp. 722, 727 (D. Utah 1973)).
98 See id at 410.
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The Wing Shing court went on to consider whether inducement could be
interpreted to broadly cover acts that typically constitute direct infringement,
namely making and selling infringing products.99 Noting that "[c]ourts have
interpreted acts of inducement exceedingly broadly,"'00 the court concluded that
"[w]hile courts have almost always considered factors beyond the manufacture
and sale of infringing products . .. the manufacture and sale of a patented product
are by themselves sufficient to constitute active inducement under § 271(b)." 0'
These statements overlooked older precedent that suggested that there is no
overlap between inducement and direct infringement.10 2 Thus, in the end, the
court held that the foreign production and sale of an infringing product knowing
that the buyer will sell the product in the United States fits within the definition
of inducement.103 Thus, Wing Shing was the first decision in the Federal Circuit
era to explicitly support both parts of the expansive view of inducement-
applying inducement extraterritorially and to acts that typically would be
considered direct infringement.
In 2009, the Eastern District of Texas provided additional support for the
expansive view of inducement. 0 5 In Honeywell International v. Acer America,
Honeywell sued CPT, a Taiwan-based company with offices in Taiwan, China
and Malaysia, for patent infringement.'06  Honeywell asserted that CPT was
liable for inducement because it supplied unfinished LCD screens to foreign
companies that incorporated CPT's screens into infringing products sold in the
U.S.10 7 CPT resisted discovery on its sales and communications with non-U.S.
companies, arguing that these activities did not constitute infringement under
U.S. patent laws.' 08 The Eastern District of Texas agreed with Honeywell's legal
theory and granted its motion to compel.'09
There were two important components to the decision. First, citing to
Wing Shing, the court said that "[a]iding and abetting direct infringement
includes selling infringing products for re-sale to consumers.""o In other words,
99 Id. at 410-11. MEMC Electronic II did not address this issue.
00 Id. at 410.
1o' Id. at 411.
102 The Wing Shing decision cited to Honeywell v. Metz Apparatewerke to support the
extraterritorial reach of inducement. Id. at 409. But Metz Apparatewerke suggests that inducement
only exists when the party did not commit direct infringement itself. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz
Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1975); see also Gould-Nat'l Batteries, Inc. v.
Sonotone Corp., 130 U.S.P.Q. 26, 29 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
103 Wing Shing, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 411.
04 For an earlier 7th Circuit decision that appears to arrive at the same result, see Metz
Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, discussed supra in notes 68 and 102.
105 See Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 2d 650, 661 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
106 Id. at 652.
107 i
's Id. at 658.
'0 9 Id. at 661.
"1 Id. at 658.
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inducement covers the same conduct as direct infringement: selling infringing
products. Yet the court did not offer any substantive discussion of this issue.
Second, the court found that "the scope of section 271(b) can extend to
extra-territorial activities."' The decision substantially tracked the analysis in
Wing Shing. It discussed Crystal Semiconductor, DSU Medical and of course
Wing Shing itself.1 12 Moreover, just like Wing Shing, the decision in Honeywell
International made no mention of the Shockley decision. But unlike the court in
Wing Shing, the Eastern District of Texas had to confront Microsoft v. AT&T, a
recent Supreme Court decision that suggested that patent laws should generally
not be interpreted to reach foreign conduct." 3
In Microsoft v. AT&T, Microsoft had been sending Windows operating
systems to foreign computer manufacturers by email or by sending a master
disk.1 4 AT&T alleged that computers equipped with Windows infringed its
patent for digitally encoding and compressing recorded speech." 5 Even though
the computers were made abroad, AT&T argued that Microsoft was liable under
§ 271(f) for supplying components of a patented invention from the United
States. The Supreme Court rejected AT&T's theory and held that Microsoft was
not "supplying components" because only copies of Microsoft's software were
being loaded into the computers."' 6 One important reason underlying the Court's
decision was the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
patent laws. The Court stated that "[t]he presumption that United States law
governs domestically but does not rule the world applies with particular force in
patent law.""' 7 The Court went on to note that the presumption tugged strongly
against the expansive interpretation of § 271 (f)."
In Honeywell International, CPT argued that under Microsoft,
inducement should not be interpreted to reach CPT's foreign activities. The
Eastern District of Texas rejected CPT's argument by distinguishing Microsoft.
Specifically, the district court said that it was "keenly aware that the Supreme
Court has given no indication as to whether the presumption against extra-
territoriality extends to section 271(b)."" 9 But the presumption is not limited to
.. Id. at 661.
11 Id. at 659.
" Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
I14 Id. at 441.
"5 Id.
116 Id. at 453 ("Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components 'from the United States ... in
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components.' . . . Under this
formulation, the very components supplied from the United States, and not copies thereof, trigger §
271(f) liability when combined abroad to form the patented invention at issue.").
"Id. at 454-55.
11 Id. at 455 ("[Tlhe presumption tugs strongly against construction of § 271(f) to encompass as a
'component' not only a physical copy of software, but also software's intangible code, and to
render 'supplie[d] . . . from the United States' not only exported copies of software, but also
duplicates made abroad.").
" Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 2d 650, 660 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
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any particular subsection of § 271. It actually traces its application in patent law
at least as far back as Deepsouth Packing v. Laitram, where it was used to help
interpret § 271(a).12 0 In Deepsouth, the Supreme Court held that a product that
was assembled abroad was not made in the United States under § 271(a) even
though all its components were made domestically.' 2 1 Together Deepsouth and
Microsoft demonstrate that the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws applies broadly to different parts of § 271.
Consequently, Honeywell International should have taken the presumption more
seriously when considering the proper scope of inducement.
Applying the Supreme Court's presumption against the extraterritorial
application of U.S. patent laws does not necessarily mean that CPT was correct
and inducement should be interpreted to exclude all foreign conduct. The
omission of a territorial limitation in the text of § 271(b) clearly indicates that
inducement reaches some categories of foreign conduct. However, the
presumption does suggest that inducement should not be interpreted to
circumvent the territorial limitations that are present in other parts of § 271-
namely subsection (a) governing direct infringement and subsection (c)
governing contributory infringement. In other words, inducement arguably does
not cover foreign conduct that qualifies as direct or contributory infringement.
Under this view, making and selling entire infringing products or substantial
components of those products abroad should not be considered an infringement
under current U.S. law. This position was not considered by the Honeywell
International decision (or by any other decision to date).
This section has critically explored the district court decisions that have
gradually adopted the expansive theory of inducement. Although there may be
good reasons for interpreting inducement to cover all types of infringing conduct
abroad, the arguments weighing against this view have not been given a full
hearing. The analysis to date has simply been too one-sided. The district courts
have ignored the Federal Circuit decision in Shockley and given inadequate
consideration to the presumption against the extraterritorial application of patent
law discussed by the Supreme Court in Microsoft and Deepsouth. At the same
time, these courts have given too much weight to the "tea leaves" left by Crystal
Semiconductor, MEMC Electronic II and DSU Medical. These three Federal
Circuit cases did not directly consider the expansive view of inducement and
statements from these opinions should be considered accordingly.
120 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitran Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) ("Our patent system makes
no claim to extraterritorial effect; 'these acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to, operate
beyond the limits of the United States,' Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. at 195, 15 L.Ed. 595 (1856),
and we correspondingly reject the claims of others to such control over our markets.").
121 Id. at 528-29. The Deepsouth decision provoked Congress to pass 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), which
explicitly states that the exportation of the unassembled components of a patented invention is an
infringement if the exporter actively induces the assembly of the device outside of the United
States. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in US. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv.
2119,2132(2008).
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IV. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DOMESTIC CONDUCT AND
COMPANIES
"Have no friends not equal to yourself"
Confucius
In the previous section, I criticized the courts' approach to the expansive
theory of inducement. These decisions have also failed to grapple with some
larger policy issues that this theory raises. The expansive theory of inducement
has some significant unintended consequences that have gone unnoticed. To
illustrate these consequences, this section examines how inducement interacts
with direct infringement in both the domestic and international contexts.
The semiconductor industry provides an excellent example because
much of the key activity takes place abroad. Most U.S. semiconductor
companies now manufacture their chips outside the United States. 12 2  Some
companies, like Intel, have simply moved their manufacturing facilities abroad to
take advantage of lower cost labor.12 3  Other companies, like Qualcomm,
Broadcom and NVIDIA, have actually outsourced their manufacturing to
semiconductor "foundries." 24  Even though the United States is the world's
largest market for electronic products and almost every electronic product
contains numerous semiconductor chips, the semiconductor companies rarely
import their chips into the United States themselves. Rather, the chips are
purchased by product companies (e.g. Apple, Dell, Sony and Nokia) that make
items like cell phones, tablets, televisions and computers. Since these product
companies generally assemble their products abroad in countries like China, the
semiconductor sales usually take place abroad as well.125  The end products
containing the semiconductor chips are then imported into the United States by
the product companies.
In many instances, patent holders desire to sue the supplier (e.g. the
semiconductor company) and not the company that made the end product (e.g. a
122 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-423, OFFSHORING: U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR
AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES INCREASINGLY PRODUCE IN CHINA AND INDIA 11 (2006) [hereinafter
GAO OFFSHORING REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06423.pdf.
123 The GAO OFFSHORING REPORT notes that "[ailthough a lower labor cost was initially a key
factor that attracted firms to offshore locations, other factors such as technological advances,
available skilled workers, and foreign government policy, also played roles." Id. at summary page.
124 JEORGE S. HURTARTE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FABLESS IC TECHNOLOGY § 1.4.2, at 8 (2007).
Prominent U.S. semiconductor foundries include Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
(TSM) and United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) in Taiwan, Charter Semiconductor in
Singapore and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) in China. Id. §
1.4.4, at 11.
125 GAO OFFSHORING REPORT, supra note 122, at 29 ("The decline in U.S. semiconductor imports
since 2000 reflects the movement from the United States to Asia of manufacturing production of
electronics products that use integrated circuits. Finished integrated circuits are moving to other




personal computer manufacturer). This is often because the product company is
the patent holder's customer while the supplier may be a competitor.12 6 In light
of the explicit territorial limits found in § 271(a) and (c), it is clear that
companies that make and sell their products abroad cannot be held liable under
the theories of direct and contributory infringement.12 7 However, inducement
under § 271(b) does not contain any territorial limitation. As a result, patent
holders have been able to rely on inducement to reach companies that make and
sell infringing products abroad. This reliance has unintended consequences.
Because of the differences between direct infringement and inducement, it is far
easier to find that conduct occurring in the United States qualifies as patent
infringement. Thus, U.S. patent law treats conduct within the United States far
worse than it treats conduct outside the country.
Let's consider two hypothetical companies. SemiCo 12 is making a
semiconductor chip in the United States. Patent Holder Industries ("PH") has a
patent that it believes is infringed by SemiCo chips. Since SemiCo 12 is making
its chips in the U.S., PH would pursue a charge of direct infringement under §
271(a). Direct infringement is a strict liability offense and PH would not have to
prove intent to infringe, much less that SemiCo 12 knew of the patent.
However, if we assume that SemiCo 12 made those same chips in China,
infringement becomes much more difficult to show. PH would not be able to
bring an action for direct infringement. Section 271(a) has an explicit territorial
limitation that prevents that assertion. Rather, PH would have to argue that
SemiCo 12 was liable for inducement under § 271(b). Specifically, PH would
characterize the act of making and selling chips in China as inducing
infringement in the United States. The product company that imported products
containing the accused chips into the United States would be the direct
infringer. However, in contrast to the case of domestic infringement, PH
would have to show that SemiCo 12 knew about its patent and intended to
infringe it.129
126 Oros, supra note 11, at 164 (noting that a patent holder would prefer to sue its customer's other
supplier and not its customer); Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN.
L. REV. 113, 154 (2011) ("[T]he patentee often will choose to sue its competitor, another
component supplier, and not the multi-component product manufacturer who is often the patentee's
customer or potential customer too.").
127 If the company has a foreign patent that corresponds to U.S. patent, the company can seek to
assert the foreign patent abroad. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 898-99 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(generally describing how separate countries have the right under international law to adjudicate
claims under the patents that each country grants).
128 PH could also argue that the end consumers that used the product containing SemiCo 12 chips
were the direct infringers.
129 Moreover, PH would also have to show that SemiCo 12 knew that its products would enter the
United States. See Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 2d 650, 660 (E.D. Tex.
2009); Wing Shing Prods. (BVI), Ltd. v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., 479 F. Supp. 2d 388, 411
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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Thus, current U.S. patent law discriminates against domestic conduct. 130
The law subjects domestic conduct to a lower standard of proof.' 3 1 A company
that makes and sells products accused of infringement in the United States is
strictly liable. If that same company were to make and sell the same products
abroad, it would only be found liable for infringement if it intended to infringe
the patent. The intent requirement also affects the time frame for potential
damages. Companies that make and sell infringing products in the United States
can be liable for six years of past damages.13 2 However, since intent requires
knowledge of the patent, foreign companies that infringe a patent cannot be liable
for any damages until they actually learn of the patent. The result is that our
patent law appears to encourage companies (that do not sell products inside the
United States) to make their products abroad.3 3
U.S. patent laws should not hold domestic conduct to a higher standard
of liability than foreign conduct. The unauthorized sale and use of infringing
products in the United States is the primary harm that patent holders suffer. This
harm is the same regardless of where the infringing products originated. The
potential remedies are the same as well.134  If the patentee lost sales, it can
recover lost profits. 3 5 If not, the patentee will be able to recover a reasonable
royalty.136  The lost profit/reasonable royalty calculation does not somehow
change because the product was previously made and sold abroad. In both
instances, the calculations will be based on the infringing products that are sold
130 This is but one aspect of a larger imbalance in patent law caused by the different scienter
requirements of direct and indirect infringement. There is also overlap between direct and
contributory infringement. Depending on how a claim is drafted, an infringing component may fall
under § 271(a) or (c). Again, this suggests the same infringement could potentially be subject to
different standards of proof simply because of claim drafting choices.
131 The same imbalance does not exist for contributory infringement because inducement and
contributory infringement have the same intent requirement. See supra Part II.B. 1.
132 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012) states that "no recovery shall be had for any infringement committed
more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the
action." This is not always the case. Past damages can be limited by the notice and marking
provisions found in 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2012).
1 Companies that sell products within the United States would still be liable for direct
infringement. Again, the semiconductor industry is an example of a company that sells its products
abroad.
114 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) provides: "Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and
costs as fixed by the court."
135 Lost profit is determined by looking at a four-factor test, under which the patent owner must
prove: "l) demand for the patented product, 2) absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, 3)
his manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and 4) the amount of the profit
he would have made." Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th
Cir. 1978).
136 The courts have used fifteen factors to determine a reasonable royalty. None of the factors says
anything about where the product was made. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,
318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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and used in the United States. In fact, because the defendants are jointly and
severally liable, the patent holder should theoretically receive the same recovery
regardless of whether it pursues a claim for foreign inducement or direct
infringement in the United States.'3 7
This is not to say that U.S. law should always treat foreign conduct the
same way it treats U.S. conduct. Limitations on personal jurisdiction inevitably
result in treating foreign companies more favorably than domestic ones.'3 8 For
example, consider those companies that make and sell infringing products abroad
with the knowledge that the products will eventually enter this country. Only
some of those companies will have any exposure for inducement-those
companies that are subject to personal jurisdiction.'" 9 Other companies that do
not have sufficient minimum contacts will not have any liability.
But the concern underlying personal jurisdiction reflects a different kind
of issue-whether to apply U.S. laws extraterritorially at all. When determining
whether a particular law should reach outside this country, the courts have looked
to several factors, including international law, international comity and choice-
of-law principles.140 In other words, the United States will sometimes decline to
enforce its laws extraterritorially in order to avoid encroaching on another
country's sovereignty. In one sense, foreign conduct and actors are treated more
favorably than their domestic counterparts in these situations. But once this
country determines it can apply its laws extraterritorially without offending these
international concerns, there is no reason to favor foreign conduct. Since the
competitive injury is the same regardless of where the conduct takes place, U.S.
patent laws should treat foreign and domestic conduct equally.
The current imbalance is simply the unintended consequence of allowing
inducement theory to swallow up direct infringement. And the current regime
may even result in negative economic consequences for the U.S. Although it is
unclear whether companies are moving their manufacturing facilities abroad
solely because of the poor treatment they receive from U.S. patent law, these
137 See Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (classifying the importers and
resellers of an infringing device as joint tortfeasors and finding that they were jointly and severally
liable); see also Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d
1084, 1115-16 (N.D. Cal. 2007). But see Chao, supra note 126, at 138-40 (suggesting that juries
may actually award different damages for the same infringement based on which combination of
defendants are sued).
138 See Oros, supra note 11, at 178 (noting that personal jurisdiction for overseas conduct is more
easily established for U.S. companies and thus disadvantages domestic companies).
139 See McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) ("The defendant's
transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to
have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted
that its goods will reach the forum State."); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano
Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) ("The placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.").
140 See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 505, 513-16 (1997) (also discussing likely congressional intent and separation-of-powers
considerations).
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laws certainly do not help retain domestic industry. But it doesn't have to be this
way. A few simple changes to the law can align the different infringement
theories and thereby place domestic and foreign conduct on the same footing.
V. THE PROPOSALS: RECONCILING INFRINGEMENT THEORY
"There are no answers, only choices."
SOLARIS (20th Century Fox 2002)
This article takes no position on whether U.S. patent laws should or
should not encompass foreign conduct that indirectly injects products into the
United States. Rather, it suggests that regardless of which view is correct, the
current law is incoherent. To the extent that the United States wishes to limit
liability for patent infringement to domestic conduct, the emerging expansive
theory of inducement frustrates that goal. By swallowing up conduct that has
previously been considered direct or contributory infringement, inducement
allows patent holders to circumvent the territorial limitations found in § 271(a)
and (c).
On the other hand, to the extent that the United States intends to have its
patent laws encompass the overseas manufacture and sale of products that end up
in the United States, it makes no sense to substitute inducement for direct
infringement in the foreign arena. Since inducement has a scienter requirement
and direct infringement is a strict liability offense, using inducement needlessly
discriminates against domestic conduct. There is clearly a need to bring
coherence to the current statutory framework. Consequently, this article offers
three very different alternative proposals.
A. The Expansive Proposal
The first proposal assumes that the United States wishes to maximize the
reach of its patent laws and impose liability on foreign conduct. Under this view,
U.S. patent law would essentially reach any conduct that affected U.S.
commerce. 14 1 Of course, this view raises serious questions of international
comity that I do not address.142 Nonetheless, if this were our country's goal,
Congress should amend § 271(a) and (c) and broaden their territorial limitations
to encompass this conduct.14 3 This proposal would level the playing field by
141 Proposals that extend the reach of U.S. patent law this far are often called "effects based." See
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (applying an effects-based test with
respect to antitrust liability); Holbrook, supra note 121, at 2154.
142 See Oros, supra note 11, at 189 (explaining the problem of having each country's patent laws
apply outside their borders).
A patent system that attempts to reach this deeply into overseas conduct clearly has issues that
need to be considered. See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 121, at 2161 ("[A] truly economically
driven effects test would extend the reach of a U.S. patent to the four corners of the globe,
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making the scienter requirement the same regardless of where the infringing
conduct takes place. The text of the "Expansive Proposal" follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States, er-imports into the United States any patented invention,
or makes or sells any patented invention with knowledge that it will be
sold or used in the United States during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States, ef-imports
into the United States or makes or sells with knowledge that it will be
sold or used in the United States, a component of a patented machine,
manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus
for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
If the Expansive Proposal were adopted, patent holders could rely on the
theory of direct infringement to pursue overseas conduct. Consequently, those
that make and sell infringing products abroad and at home would both be subject
to strict liability. No intent would be required. This would level the playing field
by putting domestic and foreign conduct on the same footing.
B. The Restrictive Proposal
Alternatively, Congress could take a more restrictive approach to the
extraterritorial effect of its laws. Under this view, Congress should amend §
271(b) by adding a territorial limitation to the statute. The text of the
"Restrictive Proposal" follows:
(b) Whoever within the United States actively induces infringement of
a patent shall be liable as an infringer.
Under the Restrictive Proposal, patent holders would no longer be able to
use inducement theory to circumvent the territorial limitation that exists for direct
and contributory infringement. Inducement would have that same limitation.
Consequently, the Restrictive Proposal would limit the extraterritorial effect of
U.S. patent laws. In a sense, this means that U.S. patent law will treat domestic
conduct harsher than foreign conduct. After all, U.S. patent laws will simply not
undermining the various policies in place in other countries and providing considerable-and
inappropriate-reach to a U.S. patent."). Consequently, Holbrook advocates an approach that
would explicitly examine foreign patent law before applying U.S. law extraterritorially. Id. at
2164-65.
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reach foreign conduct. But any decision to adopt the Restrictive Proposal should
be based on basic concerns about the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent laws. It
may be that the United States should simply defer to the patent enforcement
mechanisms available in other countries.'" Such a solution would be a coherent
approach to U.S. law. This would not leave U.S. patent holders without recourse.
They would still have the option of suing parties responsible for infringement in
the United States-that may be the importer, seller or end customer.145
C. The Compromise Proposal
One primary disadvantage of both the Expansive and Restrictive
proposals is that they both require Congress to enact legislation. Given the years
it took to pass the most recent patent legislation, there is little possibility that
patent law will receive any attention from Congress in the near future.14 6 So I
have drafted a third Compromise Proposal. Although I have framed the proposal
as an amendment to § 271, the substance of the proposal could also be adopted
by the courts. The text of the "Compromise Proposal" follows:
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer. Conduct that would be considered direct infringement
under subsection (a) or contributory infringement under subsection (c)
will not be considered active inducement.
As discussed earlier, the courts could interpret the current version of §
271(b) to exclude acts of direct and contributory infringement.147 By relying on
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. patent laws
discussed in Deepsouth and Microsoft, courts could reject any interpretation of
inducement that circumvents the territorial limitations that are present in other
parts of § 271-namely subsection (a) governing direct infringement and
subsection (c) governing contributory infringement. Under this view, activity
that typically would be considered contributory infringement would not also
qualify as inducement. Making and selling infringing products or components
that are a material part of an infringing product would not qualify. Inducement
would be limited to activities like encouraging third parties to infringe through
advertising, solicitations or instructions on how to use a product in an infringing
148way.
4 See supra text accompanying note 140.
145 See Oros, supra note 11.
146 See Rod S. Berman, Something New Under the Sun, L.A. LAW, Mar. 2012, at 34 (noting that the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) was the first
significant reform to U.S. patent laws since 1952, and that few major reforms have occurred since
the U.S. Patent Office was created in 1790).
147 See supra notes 105-121 and accompanying text.
148 Lemley, supra note 12, at 230.
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The Compromise Proposal is far from ideal. Without any express
justification, the laws would reach abroad to capture some categories of
infringing conduct and exclude others. What's more, the laws would probably be
capturing less troublesome conduct. Inducing someone to infringe carries less
culpability than directly infringing a patent.
However, activity that qualifies as inducement may be the easiest type to
offshore. For example, a company could place instructions that induce
infringement on a web server outside the United States. Companies could also
route calls to foreign-based service departments when they are concerned about
inducement. The Compromise Proposal would prevent these kinds of
subterfuges. Another advantage of the Compromise Proposal is that U.S. patent
law would no longer discriminate against domestic conduct. To the extent that
the laws operated extraterritorially, they would treat foreign and domestic acts of
infringement equally.
VI. CONCLUSION
Patent holders have relied on an expansive theory of inducement to
circumvent the territorial limitations of direct and contributory infringement.
The result has been that companies that make and sell infringing products abroad
have been found liable for inducing infringement within the United States. This
article has critically analyzed the development of this expansive theory and
argues that the courts have not considered important doctrinal and policy
implications of the theory.
From a doctrinal perspective, the courts have either overlooked or given
short shrift to the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
patent laws. Once this presumption is taken into account, courts may consider
limiting the theory of inducement so that it does not thwart the express territorial
limitations found in 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) and (c).
From a policy perspective, no one has noticed the imbalance that the
expansive theory of inducement creates between domestic and foreign
infringement. A company that makes and sells products accused of infringement
in the United States is strictly liable. If that same company makes and sells the
same products abroad, it would only be found liable for infringement if it
intended to infringe the patent. Since both types of conduct create the same
competitive injury, there is no basis for treating them differently.
This article takes no position on whether U.S. patent laws should or
should not encompass foreign conduct. Regardless of which side one favors, it is
clear that the patent laws should take a consistent approach to infringement
regardless of where the conduct is located. This article offers three alternate
proposals. Each proposal provides a more coherent framework than the current
regime. However, the proposals assume different goals. The proper choice
depends on this country's appetite for extending or limiting the reach of U.S.
patent laws and which entity-Congress or the courts-should make that
decision.
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